Why privacy-first
Cloud clipping has a data-governance problem every podcaster eventually notices.
You record a podcast episode on Wednesday. It drops Friday at 9am. Between Wednesday and Friday, you want 5 short-form clips to promote it. If you use Opus Clip, Submagic, Klap, or Vugola, that 60-minute unreleased recording has to be uploaded. It sits on their storage. It gets indexed by their analysis pipelines. Their TOS gives them broad retention and training rights. Their security posture is exactly as good as their last pentest — and none of them have published one.
What SwiftyClip does instead.
SwiftyClip is a sandboxed macOS application. Its entitlements, shipped with every build and verifiable in the .app bundle, are:
- com.apple.security.app-sandbox
- com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-write
- com.apple.security.files.downloads.read-write
- com.apple.security.network.client
- com.apple.security.device.audio-input
- com.apple.security.device.camera
- com.apple.developer.icloud-container-identifiers
Nothing in that list lets SwiftyClip upload your video to our servers. The network.cliententitlement is there for Stripe subscription sync and scheduled-post uploads you initiate yourself. Video + audio + transcripts stay on disk.
What actually reaches our servers.
Email address + subscription tier (Supabase). Stripe customer ID (for billing). Anonymous usage events if you opt in (PostHog — never video content). Scheduled-post metadata when you explicitly queue a post (retention ≤ 24h after posting). Crash reports, opt-in, with no PII attached.
That's it. Your video stays on your Mac.
For regulated teams.
Newsrooms. Legal depositions. Corporate training. Medical education. Customer interviews under NDA. SwiftyClip is the only clipper where the data-governance story you tell your legal team is "nothing leaves the device" — because that's architecturally enforced, not just a marketing claim.